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INTERGOVERNMENTAL COOPERATION AND THE
MUNICIPAL INSURANCE CRISIS
To ANDY LEAHY, ASSISTANT TO THE GOVERNOR OF THE
STATE OF ILLINOIS, 1972-1976, WHO TAUGHT
PEOPLE ABOUT GOVERNMENT AND GOVERNMENT ABOUT PEOPLE.
Louis P. Vitullo *
Scott J. Peters *
Under the Illinois Constitution of 1970, governmental units are
authorized to enter into mutual agreements whereby their re-
sources are pooled to provide services that might otherwise be
prohibitively expensive for a single unit. Messrs. Vitullo and Peters
suggest that intergovernmental cooperation can provide an effec-
tive solution for municipalities faced with the dual problems of
expanding potential liability for damages and the corresponding
difficulty in obtaining insurance. By uniting with other local gov-
ernments, a municipality can obtain adequate insurance coverage
while avoiding the large expense of a private insurance carrier.
Intergovernmental cooperation is based on the concept that the cost of
public services can be reduced by achieving economies of scale so that there is
maximum utilization of resources, facilities, and personnel.' Similar serv-
ices provided by two or more governmental units are consolidated into one
coordinated activity which transcends the boundaries of each individual
unit. Some examples of intergovernmental cooperation are joint agreements
in which one governmental unit provides services or facilities to another,2
mutual assistance agreements, 3 and organizations to combat particular prob-
lems within the delegating entities. 4
This Article considers the use of intergovernmental cooperation as a solu-
tion to the current insurance crisis facing municipal governments. After
*Partner, Friedman & Koven, Chicago, Illinois; B.A., John Carroll University; J.D., Loyola
University (Chicago).
•*Sole Practitioner, Chicago, Illinois; B.A., Macalester College; J.D., Washington University.
1. ILLINOIS DEP'T OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS & NORTHEASTERN ILLINOIS PLANNING
COMMISSION, INTERGOVERNMENTAL COOPERATION IN ILLINOIS 10 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
INTERGOVERN MENTAL COOPERATION].
2. The municipality of Pittsfield, Illinois agreed to provide 24-hour ambulance service to
the majority of townships within Pike County. The Pittsfield police department administers the
program. Pittsfield bills and collects all user fees. Each township pays a yearly fee for the service
but all policy decisions are made by the mayor and city council of Pittsfield. Id. at 183-84.
Another example is the agreement between the city and township of Robinson, Illinois, whereby
the city provides personnel to equip the township's fire protection equipment. Id. at 192-93.
3. The agreement of the Battalion Seven Mutual Aid Association, consisting of the com-
munities of Berkeley, Bellwood, Broadview, Hillside, Maywood, Melrose Park, and Westches-
ter, provides that participating members shall share fire protection, rescue, and ambulance
service during an emergency. Each member contributes equipment, a minimum of four firemen,
and $200 in annual dues for joint purchasing of necessary equipment. Id. at 189-90.
4. The city, park district, and school district of Naperville organized a defense fund to a suit
by the Homebuilders Association of Greater Chicago that challenged a Naperville ordinance.
The fund is used to finance a system of defense, including expert testimony and documentation.
An advisory committee administers the funds and staffing needs are provided by the City of
Naperville. Id. at 40-41.
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briefly analyzing the historical bases of intergovernmental cooperation in
Illinois, the cause of the municipal insurance crisis is then examined, with
particular emphasis upon expanding municipal liability for tort, civil rights,
and workers' compensation claims. As shown by two existing examples,
self-insurance and risk pooling, intergovernmental cooperation can provide a
workable remedy to the growing insurance problem.
BACKGROUND
The emergence of intergovernmental cooperation in Illinois reflects the
changing forms and needs of local governments. In 1870, the framers of the
Illinois Constitution maintained county and township governments based on
geographical boundaries 5 and revenues derived from an ad valorem property
tax." Under this system, however, local governments were hindered in the
performance of long-range projects because of the limited amount of debt
that could be incurred. 7
In addition, Dillon's Rule8 was a formidable obstacle to the solution of
local government problems. Under the rule, municipal corporations could
exercise only those powers which were: 1) expressly granted by the state
legislature; 2) necessarily implied by, or incidental to, the express powers; or
3) indispensable to the attainment of the declared purpose of the corpora-
tion.9 Local governments were forced to seek legislative authority for every
act that was desirable but not indispensable to the municipality. A further
problem arose, however, in that a constitutional ban on special legislation
5. ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. X, §§ 1-13. For an excellent discussion of the history of
townships and counties as the basic forms of local government, see Anderson & Lousin, From
Bone Gap to Chicago: A History of the Local Government Article of the 1970 Illinois Constitu-
tion, 9 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PRoc. 697, 699-700 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Anderson & Lousin].
6. ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. IX, § 1. "[Elvery person and corporation shall pay a tax in
proportion to the value of his, her, or its property. ... Id. A sales tax was not levied in Illinois
until 1933. Retailers' Occupation Tax Act, 1933 Ill. Laws 924 (current version at ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 120, §§ 440-453 (1979)), and an income tax was first imposed in 1969. Illinois Income Tax
Act, P.A. 76-261, 1969 Ill. Laws 409 (current version at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, §§ 1-101 to
17-1701 (1979)). Previously, governmental officials assumed that taxation of realty would best
ensure that wealthier citizens assumed a greater tax burden. G. FISHER, TAXES AND POLITICS: A
STUDY OF ILLINOIS PUBLIC FINANCE 127-29 (1969).
7. The amount of debt a local government could incur was limited to five percent of its
assessed property value. ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. IX, § 12. See Anderson & Lousin, supra note
5, at 700.
8. As enunciated by Justice Dillon of the Iowa Supreme Court in City of Clinton v. Cedar
Rapids & Mo. R.R., 24 Iowa 455 (1868), "[t]he true view is this: Municipal corporations owe
their origin to, and derive their powers and rights wholly from, the legislature." Id. at 475.
Accord, Barnes v. District of Columbia, 91 U.S. 540 (1875). See Anderson & Lousin, supra note
5, at 703.
9. J. DILLON, LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 132, at 237 (5th ed. 1911). See Ives v.
City of Chicago, 30 I11. 2d 582, 584, 198 N.E.2d 518, 519 (1964) (expressly recognizing the
validity of Dillon's Rule under the 1870 constitution); County of Richland v. County of Law-
rence, 12 Ill. 1, 7 (1850) (legislature found to control fund belonging to public municipal
corporation).
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required the legislature to uniformly grant the same powers to all municipal-
ities.10 Thus, while it might have been desirable to grant a certain power to
Chicago, it might also have been equally undesirable to grant the same
power to a smaller town. Further, the methods of avoiding the ban on
special legislation were either cumbersome or ineffective."
The shift in the national economy toward industrialization created addi-
tional problems for Illinois' fragmented local governments.' 2 The increasing
demand for public services often exceeded the capacity of a single govern-
mental unit. This led to the duplication and overlapping of functions by
municipalities concerned with the same problem.' 3 To correct this ineffi-
ciency, the state legislature enacted several laws permitting intergovern-
mental cooperation,' 4 but Dillon's Rule and the ban on special legislation
prevented any controlling law. Rather, the law in this area was scattered
throughout the statutes. The effect was that local officials were unsure of the
extent of their powers in light of the restrictive judicial approval of munici-
pal powers. Thus, intergovernmental cooperation occurred only where there
was clear statutory authority.',
By the time of the Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention in 1970, it was
clear that special authority was needed to solve modern problems facing
local governments. Thus, the delegates to the Sixth Convention dramatically
altered the powers of local governmental units. Dillon's Rule and legislative
supremacy gave way to a system of home rule units ' 6 and relative autonomy
10. "The General Assembly shall not pass local or special laws in any of the following
enumerated cases . . .: for . . . regulating county and township affairs; . . . incorporating
cities, towns or villages, or changing or amending the charter of any town, city or village ....
ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. IV, § 22.
11. As noted in Anderson & Lousin, supra note 5, at 703, one method of avoiding the
constitutional ban in order to grant a power exclusively to Chicago was a constitutional amend-
ment. The legislature could grant powers to Chicago alone, subject to referendum approval of a
majority of the legal voters of the city. ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. IV, § 34. Due to several
difficulties, this approach was eventually dropped from use. Anderson & Lousin, supra note 5, at
703.
The second method was by classifying areas of population. For example, a statute that began
with "any municipality having a population of more than 500,000" would only cover Chicago.
See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, § 1-4-5 (1979) (police officer of municipality with population
greater than 5(10,000 can be indemnified for injuries caused in performance of duties). However,
this method was flawed when the legislature desired that certain powers be granted to Chicago
and smaller towns, but not medium-sized towns. Anderson & Lousin, supra note 5, at 703.
12. The fragmentation of Illinois' local governments system resulted in over 6,000 units of
local government. INTERGOVERNMENTAL COOPERATION, supra note 1, at 2. See also Yackley, Amid
a Thicket of Governments, 58 ILL. B.J. 348 (1970).
13. INTERGOVERNMENTAL COOPERATION, supra note 1, at 2-3.
14. Anderson & Lousin, supra note 5, at 792-93.
15. Id.
16. Home rule unit status was automatically conferred upon all municipalities having a
population greater than 25,000 and upon any county having "a chief executive officer elected by
the electors of the county .... " ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(a). Further, any municipality with a
population of less than or equal to 25,000 may elect by referendum to become a home rule unit.
Id. Likewise, any home rule unit may elect "not to be a home rule unit." Id. § 6(b). See STATE OF
ILL. COMM'N TO STUDY COUNTY PROBLEMS, 81st Gen. Assembly 10-13 (1978).
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for localities regarding matters "pertaining to . . . [their] . . . government
and affairs." 17
Accordingly, to afford the broadest range of choice to local governments in
solving common problems, a provision was included in the new constitution
dealing exclusively with intergovernmental cooperation.'" Article VII, sec-
tion 10 of the constitution provides a basic grant of power to a home rule unit
or school district to cooperate with other governmental units and to transfer
powers among themselves. It permits participating units to pool their efforts
and encourages intergovernmental cooperation as a means of ensuring effi-
cient and economical local government.'
The Intergovernmental Cooperation Clause of the new charter was specif-
ically addressed by an Illinois court for the first time in Connelly v. Clark
County,20 where a county was operating a gravel pit for its own use in
rebuilding roads and highways. While the appellate court held there was
statutory authority for the county to operate the pit,2' it also found that the
practice of selling gravel to other units of government without an ongoing
agreement was prohibited by the new constitution. 22  The court read the
new constitution as permitting intergovernmental cooperation only when
localities jointly perform a function or operate a facility. Isolated purchases,
without a contractual obligation, were not within the scope of the Intergov-
ernmental Cooperation Clause. 23  This holding demonstrated the need for
clarification of the broad language of section 10.
17. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(a).
18. The provision states in full:
INTERGOVERNMENTAL COOPERATION
(a) Units of local government and school districts may contract or otherwise associate
among themselves, with the State, with other states and their units of local govern-
ment and school districts, and with the United States to obtain or share services and
to exercise, combine, or transfer any power or function, in any manner not prohib-
ited by law or by ordinance. Units of local government and school districts may
contract and otherwise associate with individuals, associations, and corporations in
any manner not prohibited by law or by ordinance. Participating units of govern-
ment may use their credit, revenues, and other resources to pay costs and to service
debt related to intergovernmental activities.
(b) Officers and employees of units of local government and school districts may
participate in intergovernmental activities authorized by their units of government
without relinquishing their offices or positions.
(c) The State shall encourage intergovernmental cooperation and use its technical
and financial resources to assist intergovernmental activities.
Id. § 10.
19. Id. See Anderson & Lousin, supra note 5, at 791-92. See generally Comment, Intergov-
ernmental Cooperation: Does the 1970 Illinois Constitution Give Units of Local Government the
Green Light?, 8 J. MAR. J. Prtnc. & Paoc. 295 (1975).
20. 16 Ill. App. 3d 947, 307 N.E.2d 128 (4th Dist. 1973).
21. Id. at 948-49, 307 N.E.2d at 129-30. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121, § 5-601 (1979).
22. 16 I11 App. 3d at 951, 307 N.E.2d at 131.
23. Id.
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As a result, the state legislature enacted the Intergovernmental Coopera-
tion Act,14 which clarified the policy favoring cooperation among units of
local government. The Act explains the constitutional provision in two signif-
icant ways. First, a distinction is drawn between intergovernmental agree-
ments and intergovernmental contracts. Pursuant to an intergovernmental
agreement, the Act allows any power which may be exercised by a unit of
local government to be exercised jointly with any other unit within or
without the state.25 In contrast, under an intergovernmental contract, mu-
nicipalities may enter into contracts to provide a service that any party is
authorized to perform. 26 One unit performs and pays for all administrative
functions while the other unit merely purchases the services it uses. As an
example, the Connelly court found that the county could not sell gravel to
other units absent a partnership or joint venture agreement.2 7 Under the
Act, however, this arrangement used by the county would be considered a
series of service contracts.
The second important clarification offered by the Act concerns insurance
of the joint effort. Intergovernmental contracts may authorize the parties
thereto to jointly self-insure and to use their funds to protect any other party
to the contract against liability or loss in insurable areas. 28 For example, one
municipality may contract with another to provide police service, partly in
exchange for a reimbursement of retirement and disability pension liabilities
resulting from the additional police protection. Yet, recent developments in
municipal liability have elicited the need for intergovernmental cooperation
agreements where insurance is the sole purpose.
THE MUNICIPAL INSURANCE CIUsIs
Intergovernmental cooperation has a particularly useful and important
application in the municipal insurance context. In the past it was generally
recognized that municipal liability was highly restricted.2 , The need for
insurance was much less critical and insurance underwriters could easily
meet this need. The past two decades, however, have witnessed an explosive
increase in municipal liability for tort, civil rights, and workers' compensa-
tion claims. As the limits of liability in these areas have become shifting and
uncertain, municipal insurers have become reluctant or unwilling to under-
write many municipal activities. Without insurance, of course, most munici-
24. P.A. 78-785, 1973 11. Laws 2382 (current version at ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 127, §§ 741-749
(1979)). See generally Note, The Illinois Intergovernmental Cooperation Act, 1974 U. ILL. L.F.
498.
25. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 127, § 743 (1979).
26. Id. § 745.
27. 16 Il. App. 3d at 949-51, 307 N.E.2d at 130-31.
28. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 127, § 746 (1979).
29. See W. PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 131-133, at 970-96 (4th ed. 1971);
Comment, Illinois Tort Claims Act: A New Approach to Municipal Tort Immunity in Illinois, 61
Nw. U.L. REv. 265 (1966); Comment, Tort Claims Against the State of Illinois and Its Subdivi-
sions, 47 Nw. U.L. REv. 914 (1953).
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pal projects become too risky and must be abandoned, regardless of the
government program's merit.
Expanding Local Governmental Liability and Its Impact
The increasing liability exposure of Illinois municipalities has its genesis,
in part, in the 1959 Illinois Supreme Court decision, Molitor v. Kaneland
Community Unit District No. 302.30 Molitor and its progeny 3' rendered
local government units liable for the torts of their agents and employees, a
clear break from common law principles that recognized complete sovereign
immunity in such cases. 32 In the wake of Molitor and the expansive munici-
pal liability it sanctioned, the Illinois General Assembly in 1965 reinstated
many of the pre-Molitor common law governmental immunities through the
Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act. 33
Although designed to shield municipalities from liability in certain instances,
the Act generally permits injured persons to recover damages from local
governmental units when a unit or its agents caused the injury. 34
Even in those situations where a municipality or other local entity enjoys
defenses or immunities under the Act, the protection provided by such
defenses or immunities is often quite narrow. The most obvious limitation
applies to local governmental employees' actions that exceed the Act's scope.
In such cases, the statute provides no defense or immunity, leaving the local
government liable for its employee's conduct. Examples of unprotected areas
are willful misconduct 35 or nontort actions, such as breach of contract,
workers' compensation, and occupational diseases. 3
30. 18 111. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 968 (1960), modified on other
grounds, 24 I11. 2d 467, 182 N.E.2d 145 (1962).
31. See, e.g., Kobylanski v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 63 I11. 2d 165, 347 N.E.2d 705 (1976);
Sullivan v. Midlothian Park Dist., 51111. 2d 274, 281 N.E.2d 659 (1972); Housewright v. City of
LaHarpe, 51 111. 2d 357, 282 N.E.2d 437 (1972); Fanio v. John W. Breslin Co., 51 Ill. 2d 366,
282 N.E.2d 443 (1972).
32. See, e.g., Kinnare v. City of Chicago, 171 Ill. 332, 49 N.E. 536 (1898) (immunity
extended to school districts); Town of Waltham v. Kemper, 55 Ill. 346 (1870) (county and town
immunity adopted). See generally Huff, Tom Molitor and the Divine Right of Kings, 37
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 44 (1960) (denouncing Molitor as judicial legislation); Comment, Govern-
mental Immunity in Illinois: The Molitor Decision and the Legislative Reaction, 54 Nw. U.L.
REv. 588 (1959) (praising Molitor decision).
33. 1965 Ill. Laws 2983 (current version at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, §§ 1-201 to 10-101
(1979)).
34. See City of Chicago v. Vickers, 8 Ill. App. 3d 902, 291 N.E.2d 315 (1st Dist. 1972)
(sovereign immunity with respect to local municipalities replaced by Local Governmental and
Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act); Wangerin, Actions and Remedies Against Gov-
ernmental Units and Public Officers for Nonfeasance, 11 Loy. CHI. L.J. 101 (1979).
35. See Melbourne Corp. v. City of Chicago, 76 Ill. App. 3d 595, 604, 394 N.E.2d 1291,
1298 (1st Dist. 1979) (plaintiff must allege malice to circumvent defense of Tort Immunity Act);
King v. City of Chicago, 66 I11. App. 3d 356, 384 N.E.2d 22 (1st Dist. 1978) (battery committed
by police officers); Nelson v. Nuccio, 131 I11. App. 2d 261, 268 N.E.2d 543 (1st Dist. 1971)
(tortious conduct of police officer). But see Mills v. County of Winnebago, 104 I11. App. 2d 366,
244 N.E.2d 65 (2d Dist. 1969) (plaintiff who was wounded by county deputy has cause of action
against deputy individually for willful and wanton conduct but not against county that em-
ployed deputy).
36. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 85, § 2-101 (1979).
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Where the Act's immunities or defenses do apply, a local public entity may
still face tort liability if it has secured liability insurance policies with respect
to all defenses and immunities contained in the Act. In Kobylanski v. Chi-
cago Board of Education,37 the Illinois Supreme Court construed section
9-103(b) of the Act and held that purchasing insurance waived all tort
immunity up to the amount of insurance coverage. 3  The Kobylanski case is
significant because earlier decisions appeared to view such waivers more
restrictively. For instance, in Sullivan v. Midlothian Park District,39 the
court held that purchasing public liability insurance waived tort immunity
only for failure to maintain recreational areas. 40 Similarly, in Housewright
v. City of LaHarpe41 and Fanio v. John W. Breslin Co.,42 the court held that
acquiring insurance waived certain notice and timely filing requirements
under the Act. 43 In view of Kobylanski and these other cases it appears that
obtaining liability insurance from a private carrier waives all tort immunity
to the extent of the insurance policy's coverage. 44
In addition, a recent Illinois Appellate Court decision has extended the
waiver concept to include waiver of immunity from punitive damages. In
Holda v. County of Kane,45 the plaintiff claimed that Kane County officials'
negligent operation of Kane County Jail resulted in his severe beating at the
hands of other inmates. The Second District Appellate Court concluded that
the county's procurement of liability insurance constituted a waiver of the
37. 63 111. 2d 165, 347 N.E.2d 705 (1976).
38. Id. at 173-74, 347 N.E.2d at 709.
39. 51 111. 2d 274, 281 N.E.2d 659 (1972).
40. Id. at 281-82, 281 N.E.2d at 663.
41. 51 111. 2d 357, 282 N.E.2d 437 (1972).
42. 51111. 2d 366, 282 N.E.2d 443 (1972).
43. In Housewright, the Illinois Supreme Court held that under section 9-103(b) of the Local
Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 85, §§
1-101 to 10-101 (1979), public entities that purchase insurance waive the statutory right to
written notice of an injury as a prerequisite to a suit. 51111. 2d at 366, 282 N.E.2d at 442. On the
same day, the court held in Fanio that the six-month notice and one-year limitation for suits
against a local public entity were waived by the entity's purchase of insurance to cover liability.
51 Ill. 2d at 370, 282 N.E.2d at 445.
44. One commentator has argued that the acquisition of liability insurance should result in
the waiver of only certain provisions of the Tort Immunity Act. He reasons that there are three
policy considerations underlying the establishment of the Act: (1) protection of public funds; (2)
protection of public employees in the exercise of their discretion; and (3) the separation of powers
doctrine. Because the acquisition of insurance relates only to the protection of public funds, only
statutory immunities based on the protection of those funds should be waived. Judge, Tort
Immunity Act: Only Certain Immunities are Waived by Public Entity's Purchase of Insurance,
63 ILL. B.J. 386 (1975). The Illinois Supreme Court, however, has not accepted this analysis. See
Lansing v. County of McLean, 69 Ill. 2d 562, 372 N.E.2d 822 (1978) (county waiver immunity
up to limits of public liability policy); Kobylanski v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 63 111. 2d 165, 347
N.E.2d 705 (1976) (school board waiver immunity up to limits of liability insurance policy).
45. 88 111. App. 3d 522, 410 N.E.2d 552 (2d Dist. 1980).
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Act's immunity from punitive damages under section 2-102.46 The Holda
decision represents potentially vast liability because punitive damages often
greatly exceed compensatory damages.
Compounding local governmental units' liability problems are recent de-
velopments in the civil rights field. According to the United States Supreme
Court decision in Monroe v. Pape,47 municipal corporations were considered
beyond the scope of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 because they were not
"persons." 48  Later federal cases extended this civil rights immunity to local
public entities other than municipal corporations, such as states, 49 state
agencies,50 municipal agencies 5' and townships. 5
In 1978, however, the Supreme Court abrogated the municipal immunity
doctrine in Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services.53  The
Monell Court concluded that the Monroe decision erroneously viewed section
1983 as applying only to natural persons when the statute was meant to
include both legal and natural persons. 4 By holding that municipalities and
other local governmental entities are persons under section 1983, the Monell
decision effectively eliminated a municipality's insulation from monetary,
declaratory, or injunctive relief when the basis of the claim is conduct that
"implements or executes" a policy or regulation adopted by the govern-
mental entity.5 5 This conduct includes actions that constitute "governmen-
46. Id. at 530, 410 N.E.2d at 558.
47. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). The plaintiffs alleged that the invasion and subsequent search of
their home by Chicago police officers without a warrant and the detention of Monroe at a police
station without a warrant or arraignment was a violation of their civil rights under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. 365 U.S. at 169.
48. Id. at 191. Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any state or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be held
liable to the party injured in an action at law or suit in equity or other proper
proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) (emphasis added).
49. See, e.g., Cheramie v. Tucker, 493 F.2d 586 (5th Cir.) (states not "persons" for § 1983
purposes), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 868 (1974).
50. See, e.g., Sykes v. California, 497 F.2d 197 (9th Cir. 1974) (department of motor
vehicles).
51. See, e.g., Garrett v. City of Hamtramch, 503 F.2d 1236 (6th Cir. 1974) (city planning
commission); United Farmworkers of Fla. Hous. Project, Inc. v. City of Delray Beach, 493 F,2d
.799 (5th Cir. 1974) (county planning board).
52. See, e.g., Pressman v. Chester Township, 307 F. Supp. 1084 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
53. 436 U.S. 658 (1978). The plaintiffs were pregnant employees who claimed that officials
from the Department of Social Service and the Board of Education had forced them to take
unpaid leaves of absence before they were medically advised to do so. Id. at 660-62.
54. The Supreme Court re-examined the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871
and the legislative intent to hold governmental units liable for damages for constitutional
violations resulting from governmental policy or custom. Id. at 664-89.
55. Id. at 690.
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tal custom," 5 even if such customs are not approved officially. But the status
of good faith conduct 7 was left open by Monell, leaving municipalities free
to assert a qualified immunity defense.
The good faith question, however, was recently resolved in Owen v. City
of Independence.58 In Owen, the Supreme Court considered the plaintiff's
claim for damages based upon the release of investigative reports to the news
media and plaintiff's discharge from his position as Chief of the Indepen-
dence, Missouri Police Department.' The city argued that because the City
Council members acted in good faith in releasing information concerning
Owen, the city and its council members were entitled to immunity from civil
rights claims. The Owen Court rejected this argument, concluding that a
municipality may not assert good faith as a defense in section 1983
actions.60  In a related decision, Gomez v. Toledo,6 1 the Supreme Court
pronounced that the burden of pleading good faith rests upon the defendant
and that this defense is available to a public official only if the official "has
an objectively reasonable basis for [his] belief [and]. . .the official himself is
acting sincerely and with a belief that he is doing right."'6 2  The effect of
Monell, Owen and Gomez, of course, is that the liability of local govern-
mental units for the conduct of their officials, employees, and agents has
greatly increased.
It should be noted, however, that the Supreme Court recently determined
that Congress did not intend that punitive damages be awarded against a
municipality in an action brought under section 1983. In City of Newport v.
Fact Concerts, Inc. ,' the plaintiffs sought compensatory and punitive dam-
ages against the mayor and city council of Newport, Rhode Island, for
attempting to prevent a jazz-rock group from performing at a local state
park. The Court reversed the district court's award of punitive damages,
concluding that legislative history showed that municipalities were immune
56. In Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970), Justice Harlan described the term
"governmental custom" as a practice "not authorized by written law ... [but] .. .so perma-
nent and well settled as to constitute a 'custom or usage' with the force of law." Id. at 167-68.
57. Often, public officials have been protected from personal liability when good faith
actions taken pursuant to official duties resulted in constitutional violations. See, e.g., Sala v.
County of Suffolk, 604 F.2d 207 (2d Cir. 1979) (county strip search policy enacted in good faith);
Ohland v. City of Montpelier, 467 F. Supp. 324 (D. Vt. 1979) (good faith discharge of public
employee).
58. 455 U.S. 622 (1980).
59. The statement alleged that Owen had misappropriated police department property, that
narcotics had "mysteriously" disappeared from his office, that traffic tickets had been manipu-
lated, and that suspects had been released under unusual circumstances. Brief for Petitioner at 3,
Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
60. The Court felt that Congress intended to incorporate into the statute only those common
law immunities existing at the time when the statute was enacted; thus, the Court refused to
acknowledge the good faith defense when interpreting the statute. 455 U.S. at 644.
61. 446 U.S. 635 (1980).
62. Id. at 641 (quoting Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 321 (1975)).
63. 101 S. Ct. 2748 (1981).
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from such damages in section 1983 actions.6 4  This decision represents a
significant limitation on the expanding liability of municipal officials.
While tort and civil rights immunities and defenses available to local
public entities and their officials are diminishing, yet another key source of
liability appears to be increasing-workers' compensation. 5 As a result of
expanded coverage, the cost to municipalities of workers' compensation has
increased dramatically, 66 just as it has in the private sector. For example, a
survey of Illinois municipalities shows that workers' compensation insurance
premiums rose 90.5% between July 1, 1975 and July 1, 1979.7 Moreover,
in light of recent changes in the Workers' Compensation Act that hold
municipalities liable to injured volunteer firemen, police, and civil defense
members or trainees based upon the average weekly wages earned by such
employees in their regular employment, 8 it is likely that insurance premiums
will continue to rise.
Diminishing defenses and immunities, together with expanding liability
bases, necessarily spell greater insurance costs because municipalities and
other local public entities must maintain adequate insurance coverage.
When one considers the devastating impact of a substantial civil rights
judgment, or a multitude of workers' compensation claims upon a small unit
of local government, the need for adequate insurance coverage becomes
apparent.
The funds available to pay a judgment are a function of the tax base of the
unit.6 9 The larger the tax base, the easier it is for the governing body to meet
the costs imposed by the judgment. Thus, a small municipality may not be
able to pay a large judgment because it lacks a sufficiently broad tax base.
Unlike private defendants, however, judgments against a local government
may not be executed through attachment or sale of a local governmental
unit's assets,70 an obvious result in light of the practical difficulties inherent
64. Id. at 2750-52.
65. See Witt, Risk Management: Claims By and Against City Employees, 42B NIMLO
MUN. L. REV. 280, 289 (1979).
66. See Parrish, Workmen's Compensation Law in Illinois: Some Economic Consequences of
Recent Changes, 27 DEPAUL L. REV. 715, 723 (1978).
67. Interview with James Mochal, Gallagher & Basset Insurance Agency, in Chicago, Ill.
(Aug. 28, 1981).
68. Act of September 15, 1980, P.A. 81-1482, § 10, 1980 I11. Laws 1723 (amending ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 48, § 138.10 (1979)).
69. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, § 9-107 (1979), which provides:
A local public entity may levy or have levied on its behalf taxes annually upon all
taxable property within its territory at a rate that will produce a sum which will be
sufficient to pay the cost of settlements or judgments . . . to pay the costs of
protecting itself or its employees against liability . . . , to pay the costs of and
principal and interest on bonds issued under Section 9-105, to pay tort judgments or
settlements ... to the extent necessary to discharge such obligations.
id.
70. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 34, § 604 (1979), which provides: "Execution shall not, in
any case, issue against the lands or other property of a county... " See also Midland Elec.
Coal Corp. v. County of Knox, 1 111. 2d 200, 224, 115 N.E.2d 275, 287-88 (1953).
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in attaching or selling a bridge or city street. Instead, a judgment may be
enforced through a mandamus action requiring compliance with the provi-
sions of section 9-104 of the Local Governmental and Governmental Em-
ployees Tort Immunity Act. 7' Section 9-104 provides that a judgment may
be paid in the year rendered, in the ensuing fiscal year, or in yearly install-
ments up to a maximum of ten equal annual installments plus interest. The
terms are determined by the hardship that payment of the judgment would
cause the municipality. 72 An additional tax may be levied, 73 and bonds may
also be issued, in an amount in excess of the general statutory debt limit of
the local governmental unit to satisfy the judgment. 4
A large judgment against, or settlement by, a local public entity requires
the unit to expend its general revenue funds and reduces funds that would
otherwise be available for governmental services. As previously discussed,
local governments are already pressed by dwindling revenues and escalating
costs; huge judgments only serve to create more costs and divert more reve-
nues. Furthermore, bonds issued to pay a judgment are included in deter-
mining whether a municipality has authority to issue more bonds for other
purposes. 75 Thus, once compelled to increase its indebtedness up to or in
excess of the statutory limit by issuing bonds to pay a judgment, a municipal-
ity can no longer issue additional bonds or incur additional indebtedness for
other services and projects. 7
Quite clearly, absent insurance, a substantial judgment or series of judg-
ments could monetarily and functionally cripple a municipality by forcing it
to forego or reduce services in vital areas. Yet insurance is unavailable to
some municipalities 77 and for many others it has become prohibitively expen-
sive. Due to the expanding liability of local governments and concomitant
disappearing defenses,78 insurers are facing greater underwriting costs and
71. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, § 9-104 (1979).
72. Id.
73. Id. § 9-107.
74. Id. § 9-105.
75. Bonds necessary to discharge a tort settlement or judgment against a governmental unit
may be issued for an amount, including existing indebtedness, in excess of any statutory debt
limitations. Id.
76. See Act of August 11, 1979, P.A. 81-165, § 18, 1979 Ill. Laws 952 (amending ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 85, § 851 (1979)), which provides:
[N]o county having a population of less than 500,000 and no township, school
district or other municipal corporation having a population of less than 300,000 shall
become indebted in any manner or for any purpose, to an amount, including
existing indebtedness, in the aggregate exceeding 2.875 % on the value of the taxable
property therein ...
However, this limitation does not apply to indebtedness incurred to pay firemen's and police-
men's salaries and indebtedness of sanitary districts. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, § 851.15 (1979).
77. See STATE OF ILL. COMM'N TO STUDY COUNTY PROBLEMS, 81st Gen. Assembly, at 18
(1978). See also Miles, Report of the National Institute of Municipal Law Officers Committee on
Inter-Municipal Cooperation, 41 NIMLO MUN. L. REV. 192, 194, 197 (1978); INSTITUTE FOR
LOCAL SELF GOVERNMENT, PUBLIC ACENCY LIABILITY 36-39 (1978) (California municipalities).
78. See note 29 and accompanying text supra.
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will not significantly lower municipal premiums in the near future. Thus,
local governments currently are facing an insurance crisis.
INTERGOVERNMENTAL COOPERATION AS A REMEDY
Solutions to the municipal insurance crisis can be achieved through several
forms of aggressive risk management. The most basic risk management
technique is to modify or abandon risk-prone activities. This is often accom-
plished by educating employees of dangerous work habits and improving the
safety of the work environment. With increasing costs and shrinking reve-
nues, many municipalities have made more affirmative efforts toward con-
trolling the source of their risks.71
Another risk management approach is self-insurance. Self-insurance in-
volves maintenance of an adequate fund or reserve by the local government
to meet claims as they arise as well as streamlined claims processing ° Cook
County, for example, no longer carries private sector insurance and, there-
fore, has assumed the risk for any damages caused by its employees or
officers. Thus, if a county official has an accident while negligently driving a
county vehicle on official business, Cook County assumes the cost of liability
and draws upon its reserve fund. To process such claims without the services
provided by an insurance company, Cook County employs several persons
for the sole purpose of reviewing claims against the county. In .addition,
several assistant state's attorneys devote the majority of their time to defend-
ing the County against tort claimants. Through its self-insurance plan Cook
County now meets all its insurance-related obligations with its own re-
sources, thereby saving the cost of high insurance premiums demanded by
private carriers.
Self-insurance is not practical, however, for small municipalities that lack
adequate funds and employees over which to spread large risks. Substantial
or numerous judgments would rapidly exhaust the minimal insurance funds
small local governmental units could afford to maintain and would consume
far too much employee time that could be spent performing other govern-
mental duties. Moreover, the relatively small number of employees in such
units prevents specialized training in claims processing or defense. In short,
self-insurance is a benefit derived from economies of scale that normally
result only from large operations.
Nonetheless, small municipalities have realized substantial savings by en-
tering into intergovernmental cooperation agreements through which gov-
ernmental units aggregate and share workers' compensation, tort, or other
79. For a discussion of the favorable results obtained from a risk management program
implemented in one city, see Wooderson & Hoffpauir, Risk Management in a Southern City:
The Growth of the Concept in the City of Lafayette, Louisiana, 11 URBAN LAW. 396, 401
(1979).
80. See Pfennigstorf, Governmental Risk Management in Public Policy and Legislation:
Problems and Options, 1977 AM. B. FOUNDATION REsEAnCn J. 255, 281-85.
[Vol. 30:325
INTERGOVERNMENTAL COOPERATION
liability exposures. Under such agreements8' a risk management agency is
created to serve each participating local governmental unit, referred to as a
member. As a precondition to membership, prospective members must make
initial pool contributions that are analogous in some respects to capital
contributions in partnerships. Initial contributions represent estimated loss
experiences calculated by underwriters relying on the prospective members'
past loss histories. When a member's loss experience exceeds its initial contri-
bution, supplemental pool contributions are required. Once funded and
organized, the risk management agency hires its own professional staff,
including risk managers, claims adjusters, and counsel.
The agency is governed by a board of directors, with each agency member
entitled to one vote and represented by one director on the board. The
directors, in turn, adopt by-laws and select a chairman to head the agency.
The number of members can vary during the agency's life, with new mem-
bers added upon a two-thirds vote of approval by the board. Provision is
usually made in the agency's by-laws for expulsion of members under certain
circumstances, such as failing to make payments due the agency, refusing to
undertake loss reduction programs, refusing to allow the agency reasonable
access to relevant municipal records, or failing to cooperate fully and com-
pletely with claims adjusters. Members can, of course, withdraw from the
agency, but they remain liable for their pro rata contributions to the agency's
reserve pool for the year in which they withdraw.
The type of losses covered by the agency's reserve pool are determined by
the board. Thus, an agency may offer protection and services for such areas
as property, casualty, and civil rights, or limit its coverage to a single
exposure such as workers' compensation. After an adjuster decides a claim is
within the agency's coverage, he estimates the amount the agency is willing
to pay. Members have the right to object and raise what is referred to as an
optional defense if they consider the estimate excessive. However, if a mem-
ber chooses to defend the claim and the resulting judgment exceeds the
previously rejected estimate, the member-not the agency-pays the differ-
ence between the judgment and the estimate.
Unknown to many small municipalities, risk management agencies have
served their cost-cutting purpose rather well. For example, one insurance
cooperative, dubbed IRMA (Intergovernmental Risk Management
Agency) ,S2 provides coverage for property, workers' compensation, and gen-
81. Twenty-one Illinois municipalities entered into a cooperative insurance agreement in
1980. Relevant portions of the contract and by-laws of the South Towns Agency for Risk
Management (STARM), a representative cooperative, are reproduced in the appendix to this
article so that the reader may refer to an actual application of the general principles discussed in
this section.
82. The twenty-two Illinois municipalities that comprise IRMA are mainly western and
northwestern suburbs of Chicago. IRMA evolved from a 1976 seminar where 69 northern Illinois
cities met to discuss municipal insurance problems. A committee's study of the matter led to the
establishment of IRMA in January, 1979. See Aavang, IRMA: The Nation's Largest Municipal
lnsurance Co-op, ILLINOIS IssuEs, Aug. 1980, at 13-15.
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eral liability exposures. Over its three and one-half year existence each IRMA
member has enjoyed combined premium and loss savings of 38% to 40%
compared to their previous payments and losses under private insurance
plans.8 3 Moreover, through IRMA, participating municipalities now have
extensive loss prevention and risk management programs, uniform claims
handling, and receive interest on invested pool contributions.8 4  Another
Illinois risk management agency, STARM (South Towns Agency for Risk
Management),8 5 provides coverage only for workers' compensation losses.
Like IRMA participants, STARM members have also realized substantial
reductions in combined premium and loss experience, averaging about 35 %
per member organization."8
Although the effectiveness of these agencies is well established, their exis-
tence and operations have yet to be challenged in the Illinois court system.
Some uncertainty remains as to whether they will be sanctioned. In the event
such an operation is challenged, three important issues may arise. The first is
whether these agreements, by requiring each agency member to aggregate
and share its liability with other participating units, would be considered
reciprocal pools and therefore subject to the rules and regulations of the
Illinois Insurance Code8 7 and the Illinois Department of Insurance. If so, an
agency's cost would rise significantly and its activities would be curtailed
greatly. If not, they would retain their current cost efficiency and manage-
ment flexibililty.88
Though somewhat functionally similar to reciprocal pools, risk manage-
ment agencies differ in one critical respect-their statutory authority. Recip-
rocal pools, which allow participants to combine reserves held to fund
potential judgments," are authorized by the Insurance Code itself and can
83. Id. at 13.
84. Id. at 14.
85. See note 81 supra.
86. Interview with James Mochal, Gallagher & Bassett Insurance Agency, in Chicago, I11.
(Aug. 28, 1981).
87. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 73, §§ 613-1065.724. (1979 & Supp. 1981).
88. Legislation was recently introduced in the Illinois House of Representatives to specifi-
cally amend the Insurance Code so that intergovernmental risk management agencies would be
regulated by the Department of Insurance. H.R. 553, 82d Ill. Gen. Assembly, 1st Sess. (1981).
However, the bill died in the City and Villages Committee in the 1981 Spring Session.
89. One authority describes reciprocal pools as:
that system whereby individuals, partnerships, or corporations engaged in a similar
line of business undertake to indemnify each other against a certain kind or kinds of
losses by means of a mutual exchange of insurance contracts, usually through the
medium of a common attorney in fact appointed for that purpose by each of the
underwriters under agreements whereby each member separately becomes both an
insured and an insurer with several liability only.
2 G. CoucH, INSURANCE § 18:11 (2d ed. 1959). See W.R. & Co. v. Harding, 348 Ill. 454, 181
N.E. 331 (1932) (analysis of reciprocal insurance pools in a tax context); Mosteiko v. National
Inter-Insurers Corp., 229 I11. App. 153 (3d Dist. 1923) (analysis of reciprocal insurance pools in
context of broker's liability).
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only exist pursuant to that code.90 Risk management agencies, on the other
hand, find their authorization in the Illinois Constitution's strong endorse-
ment of intergovernmental cooperation"' and the Intergovernmental Coop-
eration Act's express sanction of such insurance arrangements in particu-
lar.12 As discussed earlier, Illinois courts have followed these constitutional
and statutory mandates by liberally interpreting their scope and purpose. 3
It seems logical that courts will follow the same pattern when reviewing the
status of risk management agencies because of their express statutory ap-
proval and the important, if not critical, municipal insurance need they fill.
A second issue may arise with respect to implementing such intergovern-
mental insurance cooperatives. Municipalities must anticipate long term
financial obligations to participate in shared risk agencies, but annual appro-
priations normally will not provide the necessary fiscal commitment. In
addition, the Illinois Municipal Code expressly prohibits municipalities from
obligating unappropriated funds. 4 Thus, municipalities appear unable to
form risk management agencies because they cannot appropriate sufficient
current funds and cannot obligate any future unappropriated funds.
This funding dilemma, however, was squarely addressed in a 1974 Illinois
Attorney General opinion." The question was whether a municipality that
was contracting for additional police services could obligate itself on a long
term basis to reimburse the municipality providing the services for possible
future disability and retirement pension claims. The authority for the police
contract was the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act and article VII, section
10, of the 1970 Illinois Constitution. The Attorney General concluded that
the Act, in effect, repealed or amended the provision of the Municipal Code
that prevented the obligation of unappropriated funds. Because the two
statutes were in direct conflict, the later legislation was found to prevail.96
Although no subsequent attorney general or court opinions have examined
the unappropriated funds question, the 1974 attorney general opinion should
be followed because of its persuasive emphasis upon Illinois' established
public policy favoring intergovernmental cooperation.
Finally, there may be a question of whether the establishment of a risk
pool by municipalities constitutes a waiver of immunity under the provisions
of the Tort Immunity Act.9 7 Although this issue was not squarely addressed,
an Illinois appellate court has held that self-insurance does not constitute
such a waiver. In Beckus v. Chicago Board of Education,98 the plaintiff
90. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, §§ 673-697 (1979).
91. See notes 16-19 and accompanying text supra.
92. See notes 24-28 and accompanying text supra.
93. See notes 38-46 and accompanying text supra.
94. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 24, § 8-1-7 (1979). See Chicago Patrolman's Ass'n v. City of Chicago,
56 Ii. 2d 503, 309 N.E.2d 3, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 839 (1974).
95. 1974 Op. A-r'y GEN. No. S-696.
96. Id.
97. See notes 37-44 and accompanying text supra.
98. 78 111. App. 3d 558, 397 N.E.2d 175 (1st Dist. 1979).
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sought recovery for injuries sustained in a school playground accident.99 The
court held that the Board of Education's self-insurance program, which
called for self-insurance up to one million dollars, 1°' did not waive the
Board's immunity up to that limit. 10 By analogy, a risk pool is nothing
more than a combination of self-insurers. Therefore, in light of Beckus, risk
pooling should not constitute a waiver of immunity.
In sum, the growing liability of municipalities has caused an insurance
crisis for small local public entities. Although insurance is often prohibitively
expensive, frequently it is not available at any cost. Self-insurance fills the
gap for those governmental entities large enough to undertake it, supple-
mented by risk reduction or control programs where possible. For small
governments, risk management agencies provide the same services at inex-
pensive rates through intergovernmental cooperation. Indeed, such agencies
have proved highly successful. If the legality of a risk management agency is
challenged, the agency will probably prevail because of its strong constitu-
tional and statutory foundation.
CONCLUSION
Declining revenues and spiraling costs compel more efficient management
practices by local public entities. A key tool in the struggle with these twin
problems is intergovernmental cooperation, which encourages greater utili-
zation of existing resources by exploiting advantages created through econo-
mies of scale. Though still in its infancy, intergovernmental cooperation has
been well received by the courts because of its useful public purpose and its
strong constitutional and statutory underpinnings.
The expanding liability exposure of small local governments has brought
forth a relatively new form of intergovernmental cooperation, the risk man-
agement agency. As with other intergovernmental cooperative activities,
such agencies have promoted less expensive and more professional manage-
ment practices, resulting in substantial savings and better insurance coverage
for participating municipalities. Although some doubt exists as to the appli-
cability of insurance regulations, and the agencies' power to use unappropri-
ated funds, such questions should be resolved in favor of the risk manage-
ment agencies. The insurance crisis alleviated by these agencies more than
justifies the minimal legal risks that may attend them.
99. Id. at 559, 397 N.E.2d at 176.
100. The appellate court noted that the Board of Education invited bids for liability insurance
coverage for a lesser amount but that it was unsuccessful in obtaining such coverage. Id. at 561,
397 N.E.2d at 178.
101. As the court noted:
The purpose of section 9-103(b) of the [Tort Immunity] Act is to require that when a
local public entity is immune from suit, its insurance carrier cannot avoid liability by
invoking the entity's immunity .... In this case, the insurance carrier's policy did
not cover plaintiffs claim, and plaintiff's claim is also barred against defendant
pursuant to the Tort Immunity Act.
Id. (citations omitted),
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APPENDIX
CONTRACT AND BY-LAWS
SOUTH TOWNS AGENCY FOR RISK MANAGEMENT*
ARTICLE I. Definitions and Purpose.
Purpose:
The South Towns Agency For Risk Management (STARM) is a cooperative agency voluntarily
established by contracting units of local government as defined in the Illinois Constitution of
1970 pursuant to Article VII, Section 10 of the 1970 Constitution of the State of Illinois and
Chapter 127, Section 746 of the Illinois Revised Statutes for the purpose of seeking the prevention
or lessening of casualty losses to municipal properties and injuries to persons or property which
might result in claims being made against such units. Initially, the AGENCY will create a joint
Risk Management Pool for workers' compensation claims.
It is the intent of the MEMBERS of this AGENCY to create an entity which will administer a
Joint Risk Management Pool and utilize such funds contributed by the MEMBERS to defend and
protect, in accordance with these By-Laws, any MEMBER of the AGENCY against stated
liability or loss. Such By-Laws shall constitute the substance of a contract among the MEM-
BERS.
All funds contained within the Risk Management Pool are funds directly derived from its
MEMBERS who are local governments within the State of Illinois. It is the intent of the parties
in entering into this agreement that the creation of this AGENCY shall not waive, on behalf of
any local public entity or public employees as defined in the Local Governmental and Govern-
mental Employees Tort Immunity Act, any defenses or immunities therein provided. This intent
shall be more fully implemented as the scope of risk management undertaken by them through a
joint municipal self-insurance program using governmental funds shall increase beyond workers'
compensation claims. Specifically, the MEMBERS of this AGENCY intend to effect no waiver of
immunities through their contribution of public funds retained within the Risk Management
Pool and not used to purchase excess or stop loss insurance policies. Such contributions being
reserves to protect against uninsured risks in accordance with Chapter 127, Section 746, are not
intended to constitute the issuance of a policy for insurance coverage, (by an insurance company
authorized by the Department of Insurance to write such coverage in Illinois), as provided in
Chapter 58, Section 9-103 of the Illinois Revised Statutes.
ARTICLE II. Powers and Duties.
The powers of the AGENCY to perform and accomplish the purposes set forth above shall,
within the budgetary limits and procedures set forth in these By-Laws, be the following:
(a) To employ agents, employees and independent contractors,
(c) To carry out educational and other programs relating to risk reductions,
(d) To cause the creation of, see to the collection of funds for, and administer a risk
management pool,
(g) To provide risk management services including the defense of and settlement of
claims,
ARTICLE III. Participation.
New MEMBERS shall be admitted only by a two-thirds (2/3) vote of the entire membership of
the Board of Directors and subject to the payment of such sums and under such conditions as the
Board shall in each case or from time-to-time establish.
*Prepared by: Stewart H. Diamond, Ancel, Glink, Diamond & Murphy, P.C., Chicago,
Illinois.
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ARTICLE IV. Commencement of Agency and Term.
Units of local government, ... wanting to join the AGENCY, shall pass an ordinance
authorizing unconditional membership in STARM in accordance with the terms of this agree-
ment. Such municipalities shall forward to the South Suburban Mayors and Managers Associa-
tion (SSMMA) the full amount of their first year's initial pool contribution. . . . That sum is
.9023% of the manual rate which would apply for all officers and employees of the prospective
MEMBERS entitled to workers' compensation coverage as last furnished to Arthur J. Gallagher
& Company.
ARTICLE V. Board of Directors.
(a) There is hereby established a Board of Directors of the AGENCY. Each MEMBER unit of
local government shall by majority vote of its corporate authorities elect one (1) person to
represent that body on the Board of Directors for a term of one (1) year. The MEMBER may also
select an alternative representative to serve when the initial representative is unable to carry out
his duties. The person and alternate selected need not be an elected official of the MEMBER. At
its first meeting of each fiscal year, the Board of Directors shall elect one (1) of its members to
serve as Chairman of the Board until the conclusion of the fiscal year ...
(b) The Board of Directors shall determine the general policy of the AGENCY which policy
shall be followed by all AGENCY officers, agents, employees and independent contractors
employed by the AGENCY. It shall have the responsbility for (1) Hiring of AGENCY officers,
agents, non-clerical employees and independent contractors, (2) Setting of compensation for all
persons, firms and corporations employed by the AGENCY, (3) Setting of fidelity bonding
requirements for employees or other persons, (4) Approval of amendments to the By-Laws, (5)
Approval of the acceptance of new MEMBERS, (6) Approval of the annual budget of the
AGENCY, (7) Approval of educational and other programs relating to risk reduction, (8)
Approval of reasonable and necessary loss reduction and prevention procedures which shall be
followed by all MEMBERS, (9) Approval of annual and supplementary payments to the Risk
Management Pool for each MEMBER. The Board of Directors shall establish such rules and
regulations regarding the payout of funds from the Risk Management Pool as shall from time-to-
time seem appropriate.
(g) A greater vote than a majority of a quorum shall be required to approve the following
matters:
(ii) The admission of a new MEMBER and the expulsion of a MEMBER shall require
the affirmative two-thirds (2/3) vote of the entire membership of the Board of
Directors,
(iv) The amendment of these By-Laws to cause the termination of this agreement
sooner than five (5) years after its commencement, a reduction or elimination in the
scope of loss protection set out in Article IX to be furnished by the self-insurance pool
derived from payments from the MEMBERS, the amendment of these By-Laws to
cause a modification of more or less than 25 % as the high or low range of the pool
contribution factor, as defined within Article VIII(d), and the expansion of the scope
of coverage of the AGENCY beyond that from time-to-time contained within Article
IX, shall require the recommendation of a majority vote of the Board of Directors
plus the approval of such amendment by affirmative two-third (2/3) vote of the
MEMBERS evidenced by resolutions of the respective corporate authorities.
In the case of the expansion of the scope of coverage of the AGENCY, in addition
to the greater than majority vote set out above, it shall also be required that the new
Joint Risk Management Pool to be created for the purpose of funding the expanded
coverage shall be in at least an amount certain which amount shall be specified in
the resolutions passed by the corporate authorities of the MEMBERS. Provided,
however, that the corporate authorities of any MEMBER which votes against an
expansion of the scope of coverage of the AGENCY beyond the area of Workers'
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Compensation shall be given a single opportunity to entirely withdraw from the
AGENCY before the effective date of the expansion. Such opportunity to withdraw
may only be exercised if the expansion in the scope of the coverage of the AGENCY
actually takes place. The corporate authorities of MEMBERS which vote against
such an expansion shall be given a period of at least thirty (30) days following the
date upon which all requisites for expansion had taken place in which to elect
whether to remain in the group or withdraw ...
ARTICLE VIII. Finances and Risk Management Pool.
(c) Each MEMBER of the AGENCY shall make such annual payments to the Risk Manage-
ment Pool as are approved by an affirmative two-thirds (2/3) vote of the entire membership of
the Board of Directors. In determining such payments, the Board shall utilize at least the
following factors: manual rates, the joint experience of the MEMBERS, audited employment
records, the modification factor set forth in Article VIII(f), anticipated administrative costs and
the cost of excess and aggregate insurance.
(e) Each MEMBER of the AGENCY shall make supplementary payments to the Risk Manage-
ment Pool as are approved by the Board of Directors, providing, however, that such additional
sums shall be assessed in the same proportion as annual payments for the year in question except
as such proportions may be modified by the Board of Directors after an audit. The forwarding of
such annual and supplementary payments within a time specified in notices to the MEMBERS
giving them not less than forty-five (45) days to make such payments, shall be of the essence of
this contract. Except as such payments may be required as a result of an audit, supplementary
payment shall only be required by the Board of Directors in a situation in which there is a
reasonable concern that the sum remaining from the annual payment will not be sufficient to
meet the responsibilities of the AGENCY established in these By-Laws. MEMBERS shall be
responsible for supplementary payments during the entire life of the AGENCY and any later
period when claims or expenses need be paid which are attributable to the year of membership
when the event out of which the expense or claim occurred.
(f) In subsequent years, the Board of Directors may require the annual or supplementary
payments to be made on a monthly or quarterly basis. The Board of Directors may, beginning
with the third fiscal year of the AGENCY, establish debits or credits in the pool contribution
payment for those MEMBERS with above average or below average loss or claim records. Such
increase or decrease above or below the payment which would otherwise be required without
the experience modification shall not effect such unmodified amount by more than plus or minus
25%.
ARTICLE X. Excess Insurance.
The AGENCY will purchase excess insurance from a company approved by the Department of
Insurance to write such coverage in Illinois. The amount of such excess insurance shall initially
be a limit of $5,000,000.00 in excess of the AGENCY's deductible of $250,000.00 per occur-
rence.
In addition to the stated excess insurance coverage, the AGENCY will obtain aggregate stop
loss insurance such that in the event that the AGENCY should in any single year expend a
maximum aggregate sum set from time-to-time by the Board of Directors for the payment of
claims, the stop loss protection would pay additional claims above that amount to certain
maximum annual amount. The Board of Directors shall determine the commencement level of
the aggregate stop loss protection and its limit based upon the current assets and risk history of
the AGENCY.
For the first year of the AGENCY's existence, the sequence of the obligations of the MEM-
BER, the AGENCY and the excess insurer for a workers' compensation claim resulting in
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:325
liability within the scope of the self-insurance, catastrophe excess insurance and stop loss insur-
ance to be provided is as follows:
The AGENCY shall pay any claim under the worker's compensation statute of the
State in accordance with the scope of loss protection set forth in ARTICLE IX. The
next level of responsibility shall be that assumed by the excess insurer. In the event
that a series of losses should exceed the amount of coverage provided by the Risk
Management Pool, the excess insurance and the stop loss coverage for any one year,
then the payment of such uncovered valid loss shall be the obligation of the individ-
ual MEMBER or MEMBERS against whom the claim was made and perfected by
judgment or settlement. In subsequent years, the Board of Directors in establishing
the funding level of the AGENCY shall determine whether, as is the case in the first
year, the Joint Risk Management. Pool will be congruent with the level of the
commencement of excess and aggregate insurance coverages.
ARTICLE XI. Obligations of Members.
The obligations of MEMBERS of the AGENCY shall be, as follows:
(a) To appropriate or budget for, where necessary to levy for and to promptly pay all initial,
annual and supplementary or other payments to the Risk Management Pool at such times and in
such amounts as shall be established by the Board of Directors within the scope of this agree-
ment. Any delinquent payments shall be paid with a penalty which shall be equivalent to the
prime rate of interest on the date of delinquency or the highest interest rate allowed by statute to
be paid by an Illinois non-home rule municipality whichever is greater.
(b) To select a person to serve on the Board of Directors and to select an alternate representa-
tive.
(c) To allow the AGENCY reasonable access to all facilities of the MEMBER and all records
including but not limited to employment and financial records which relate to the purpose or
powers of the AGENCY.
(d) To allow attorneys employed by the AGENCY to represent the MEMBER in investigation,
settlement discussions and all levels of litigation arising out of any claim made against the
MEMBER within the scope of loss protection furnished by the AGENCY.
(e) To furnish full cooperation with the AGENCY's attorneys, claims adjusters, the Risk
Manager and any agent, employee, officer or independent contractor of the AGENCY relating
to the purpose and powers of the AGENCY.
(f) To follow in its operations all loss reduction and prevention procedures established by the
AGENCY within its purpose and powers.
(g) To report to the AGENCY as promptly as possible all incidents which could result in the
AGENCY being required to pay a claim.
ARTICLE XIV. Optional Defense by Municipality.
The Board of Directors will promulgate rules and procedures to allow MEMBERS the reason-
able opportunity to prevent the AGENCY from settling cases or claims in a manner contrary to
the wishes of the MEMBER. Such rules and procedures may, among other matters, include the
following items:
(1) An amount of the settlement at which the MEMBER may exercise this privilege,
(2) The notice of settlement, if any, and the time and manner within which the
decision of the MEMBER to object to the settlement shall be transmitted to the
AGENCY,
(3) Who shall bear costs of the defense of the claim or case which occur after the
MEMBER has prevented the settlement from taking place.
The rules and procedures shall provide that where the MEMBER has exercised its privilege to
prevent the settlement of the case or claim, it shall be responsible for any later judgment or
settlement which disposes of the case above the amount of the settlement which had previously
been reached between the claimant and the AGENCY.
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ARTICLE XVI. Expulsion of Members.
By the affirmative vote of two-thirds (2/3) of the entire membership of the Board of Directors,
any MEMBER may be expelled. Such expulsion, which shall take effect at the beginning of the
next fiscal year, may be carried out for one or more of the following reasons:
(a) Failure to make any payments due to the AGENCY,
(b) Failure to undertake or continue loss reduction and prevention procedures
adopted by the AGENCY,
(c) Failure to allow the AGENCY reasonable access to all facilities of the MEMBER
and all records which relate to the purpose or powers of the AGENCY,
(d) Failure to furnish full cooperation with the AGENCY's attorneys, claims ad-
justers, the Risk Manager and any agent, employee, officer or independent contrac-
tor of the AGENCY relating to the purpose and powers of the AGENCY,
(e) Failure to carry out any obligation of a MEMBER which impairs the ability of
the AGENCY, to carry out its purpose or powers.
No MEMBER may be expelled except after notice from the AGENCY of the alleged failure along
with a reasonable opportunity of not less than thirty (30) days to cure the alleged failure. ...
ARTICLE XVII. Termination of the Agency.
If, at the conclusion of the fifth year, the AGENCY is not continued by the entry of some or all
then current MEMBERS into a new Contract and By-Laws agreement, all withdrawing MEM-
BERS shall remain fully obligated for their portion of any claim against the assets of the Risk
Management Pool which was created during the term of the membership of the withdrawing
MEMBERS along with any other fulfilled obligation, including but not limited to calls for
supplementary payments for years of their membership which may be called for in subsequent
years. In the event that the AGENCY is not continued beyond its initial five-year term, the
Board of Directors shall continue to meet on such a schedule as shall be necessary to carry out the
winding up of the affairs of the AGENCY. If the AGENCY shall continue in operation, the
withdrawing MEMBERS shall continue to hold membership on the Board of Directors but they
shall only vote on matters affecting their limited continuing interest in the AGENCY. Those
MEMBERS continuing to participate in the existence of the AGENCY at the end of the five-year
term shall determine whether any funds of the AGENCY should be distributed to withdrawing
MEMBERS.
DATED:.__ , 19 .
ACCEPTED:
Mayor
Municipal Clerk

